Reconciling realism with humeanism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):465 – 486 (2002)
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Abstract

The central purpose of this essay is to consider some of the more prominent reasons why realists have rejected the Humean theory of motivation. I shall argue that these reasons are not persuasive, and that there is nothing about being a moral realist that should make us suspicious of Humeanism.

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Terence Cuneo
University of Vermont

Citations of this work

Motivational internalism.Christian Basil Miller - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233-255.
Motivation in agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.
Reidian Moral Perception.Terence Cuneo - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):229 - 258.
Pure Cognitivism and Beyond.Attila Tanyi - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):331-348.

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References found in this work

Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Virtue and Reason.John Mcdowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
Skepticism about practical reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1997 - In Roger Crisp & Michael Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.

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