Abstract
Although extremely comprehensive in its subject-matter, catholic in its treatment of diverse points of view, and lucid, this book is not simply a survey. Rather, it is, in its own way, original—not because any information or thesis it contains is new, but because it offers a clear, synoptic, and sophisticated look at what has been a relatively ill-defined and fragmented sector of philosophy, that of determining the nature of the "behavioral sciences." Kaplan's way of accomplishing this is to consider the concepts and activities of science "functionally"; and he generally finds that "no one function can suffice" to show us what, e.g., a law of nature is, or what an experiment is, or what a model is, etc. Thus he typically finds other, mutually competing theories both partially true and too narrow. He also has much that is illuminating to say about the Deweyan ideas that the logic of science is fundamentally a "logic-in-use" ; and that scientific concepts are "open" and properly depend on the context of inquiry, rather than on the logician, for their "closure." Consonant with these themes is his stress on the openness of the concept of methodology itself: behavioral scientists, he contends, will gain no salvation merely by finding better procedures. Of greater importance are the values, choices, and invention of the inquirer himself; and Kaplan, accordingly, treats these matters in detail.—C. T. W.