Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2):187-210 (2016)

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_ Source: _Page Count 24 Accounts of non-naturalist moral perception have been advertised as an empiricist-friendly epistemological alternative to moral rationalism. I argue that these accounts of moral perception conceal a core commitment of rationalism—to substantive a priori justification—and embody its most objectionable feature—namely, “mysteriousness.” Thus, accounts of non-naturalist moral perception do not amount to an interesting alternative to moral rationalism
Keywords moral perception   intuitionism   moral realism   non-naturalism   Audi
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1163/17455243-4681053
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References found in this work BETA

Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Perception.Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1).
On Experiencing Moral Properties.Indrek Reiland - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):315-325.
Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge.David Faraci - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (1):63-73.

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