Abstract
In "Against the Indicative," AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF
PHILOSOPHY 72 (1994): 17-26, and more recently in "Classifying
`Conditionals': the Traditional Way is Wrong", ANALYSIS 60 (2000):
147, V.H. Dudman argues that (a) `If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy then
someone else did' and (b) `If Oswald doesn't shoot Kennedy then
someone else will' should not be classified together as "indicative
conditionals." Dudman relies on the assumption that (a) is entailed by
(c) `Someone shot Kennedy', whereas (b) is not entailed by (d)
`Someone will shoot Kennedy'. I argue that the same reasoning which
shows that (d) does not entail (b) also shows that (c) does not entail
(a). One upshot is that Dudman's and Mellor's respective
interpretations of so-called past indicative conditionals cannot be
correct.