The Astonishing Hypothesis

Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1):10-16 (1994)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

[opening paragraph] -- Clark: The `astonishing hypothesis' which you put forward in your book, and which you obviously feel is very controversial, is that `You, your joys and sorrows, your memories and ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will are, in fact, no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells. As Lewis Carroll's Alice might have phrased it: `You're nothing but a pack of neurons'.' But it seems to me that this is not so astonishing a statement for a scientist to make. Isn't this what reductionist science has always believed?

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-21

Downloads
1 (#1,913,104)

6 months
1 (#1,516,021)

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience.Evan Thompson - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.
Naturalized phenomenology.Dan Zahavi - 2009 - In S. Gallagher & D. Schmicking (eds.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Springer.

View all 302 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references