Abstract

Simondon’s work aims to reform the fundamental concepts of philosophy through a new theory of being as ontogenesis. In his eponymous book, Simondon develops this theory, primarily focusing on the notion of individuation. He puts forward a conception of the individual, taking into consideration the dimension of its being that produce him as an individual, that is the pre-individual. As Simondon resumes the effort of philosophical reflection starting from this primitive reality, he claims to be able to develop this theory of ontogenesis and carry out this reform of philosophical concepts. Thus, ontogenesis appears as a new first philosophy, the starting point for the construction of a system ensuring the de jure foundation of the universality of knowledge. However, it has often been noticed that the way of speaking employed by Simondon contrasts with this ambition. His reasoning is built on postulates and hypotheses and is most often presented through the precaution of the conditional. As if, fundamentally, the task of philosophy was less to realize an ambition, than to make a promise. The nature of philosophical thought in Simondon is caught in this contradiction: on the one hand thetic, even apodictic, and on the other hypothetical, even optative. At the center of this contradiction is a question: can we know individuation? In other words, is a science of the pre-individual possible? Simondon's answer is complicated: “nous ne pouvons, au sens habituel du terme, connaître l'individuation.” (2013, p. 36). In order to clarify this answer, it seems necessary to follow the path he opens for us, by asking: in which meaning should knowledge be taken so that ontogeny will allow itself to be known? In this direction, we find the development of the analogical method and the affirmation of transductive thought, as a means of access to the ontogenetic dimension of the real. But what can we expect from this method and this kind of thinking? The ambition of ontogenic thinking implies that the theory of individuation has a universal validity, but Simondon remains cautious: “[i]l se peut que l'ontogénèse ne soit pas axiomatisable” (2013, p. 228). Our article is devoted to analyzing the reasons for this caution. Why could ontogenesis not be axiomatizable? From this question, Simondon deduces a definition of philosophy : “la pensée philosophie [est] comme perpétuellement marginale par rapport à toutes les autres études” (2013, p. 228). Our goal is to clarify the meaning of this definition. We will attempt to show that this marginality is explained by what we propose to call the ontogenetic finitude of the philosophizing subject. More precisely, Simondon's ontogenetic theory involves the conception of a subject for whom it’s impossible to reflect all of the ontogenetic conditions of his own thought. This means that the problematic at the start of philosophical thought always remains partially obscure to the subject. This obscurity is, on the one hand, the driving force that individuate philosophical thought, the promise of its renewal, and, on the other, that which de jure limits its claim to universality.