The first history of postwar mathematics, offering a new interpretation of the rise of abstraction and axiomatics in the twentieth century. Why did abstraction dominate American art, social science, and natural science in the mid-twentieth century? Why, despite opposition, did abstraction and theoretical knowledge flourish across a diverse set of intellectual pursuits during the Cold War? In recovering the centrality of abstraction across a range of modernist projects in the United States, Alma Steingart brings mathematics back into the conversation about (...) midcentury American intellectual thought. The expansion of mathematics in the aftermath of World War II, she demonstrates, was characterized by two opposing tendencies: research in pure mathematics became increasingly abstract and rarified, while research in applied mathematics and mathematical applications grew in prominence as new fields like operations research and game theory brought mathematical knowledge to bear on more domains of knowledge. Both were predicated on the same abstractionist conception of mathematics and were rooted in the same approach: modern axiomatics. For American mathematicians, the humanities and the sciences did not compete with one another, but instead were two complementary sides of the same epistemological commitment. Steingart further reveals how this mathematical epistemology influenced the sciences and humanities, particularly the postwar social sciences. As mathematics changed, so did the meaning of mathematization. Axiomatics focuses on American mathematicians during a transformative time, following a series of controversies among mathematicians about the nature of mathematics as a field of study and as a body of knowledge. The ensuing debates offer a window onto the postwar development of mathematics band Cold War epistemology writ large. As Steingart's history ably demonstrates, mathematics is the social activity in which styles of truth-here, abstraction-become synonymous with ways of knowing. (shrink)

We give a general account of the goals of axiomatization, introducing a variant on Detlefsen’s notion of ‘complete descriptive axiomatization’. We describe how distinctions between the Greek and modern view of number, magnitude, and proportion impact the interpretation of Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry. We argue, as did Hilbert, that Euclid’s propositions concerning polygons, area, and similar triangles are derivable from Hilbert’s first-order axioms. We argue that Hilbert’s axioms including continuity show much more than the geometrical propositions of (...) Euclid’s theorems and thus are an immodest complete descriptive axiomatization of that subject. (shrink)

In 1900 David Hilbert announced his famous list of then-opened mathematical problems; the problem number 6 in this list is axiomatization of physical theories. Since then a lot of systematic efforts have been invested into solving this problem. However the results of these efforts turned to be less successful than the early enthusiasts of axiomatic method expected. The existing axiomatizations of physical and biological theories provide a valuable logical analysis of these theories but they do not constitute anything like (...) their standard presentation,which can be used for transmission, evaluation, and justification of physical and biological knowledge. This state of theart in the axiomatization of physics is strong evidence that the standard notion of axiomatic theory stemming from Hilbert and Tarski is not appropriate for thet ask. However in the recent years in mathematics there emerged a new axiomatic approach best represented by the Homotopy Type theory (HoTT). We argue that the constructive axiomatic architecture used in HoTT has better chances to be successfully applied in physics as well as in computer science and engineering. (shrink)

At the centre of the traditional discussion of truth is the question of how truth is defined. Recent research, especially with the development of deflationist accounts of truth, has tended to take truth as an undefined primitive notion governed by axioms, while the liar paradox and cognate paradoxes pose problems for certain seemingly natural axioms for truth. In this book, Volker Halbach examines the most important axiomatizations of truth, explores their properties and shows how the logical results impinge on the (...) philosophical topics related to truth. In particular, he shows that the discussion on topics such as deflationism about truth depends on the solution of the paradoxes. His book is an invaluable survey of the logical background to the philosophical discussion of truth, and will be indispensable reading for any graduate or professional philosopher in theories of truth. (shrink)

According to the analysis of concessive conditionals suggested by Crupi and Iacona, a concessive conditional $$p{{\,\mathrm{\hookrightarrow }\,}}q$$ p ↪ q is adequately formalized as a conjunction of conditionals. This paper presents a sound and complete axiomatic system for concessive conditionals so understood. The soundness and completeness proofs that will be provided rely on a method that has been employed by Raidl, Iacona, and Crupi to prove the soundness and completeness of an analogous system for evidential conditionals.

The series offers a publication forum for innovative works on all topics of analytic philosophy. The focus is on the disciplines of theoretical philosophy: metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, philosophy of language, logic. Furthermore, works that additionally include contributions to the history of philosophy are also welcome.

We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to be true (...) in KF and conjectured that the detour through classical logic in KF is dispensable. We refute Reinhardt's Conjecture, and provide a direct axiomatization PKF of Kripke's theory in partial logic. We argue that any natural axiomatization of Kripke's theory in Strong Kleene logic has the same proof-theoretic strength as PKF, namely the strength of the system RA< ωω ramified analysis or a system of Tarskian ramified truth up to ωω. Thus any such axiomatization is much weaker than Feferman's axiomatization KF in classical logic, which is equivalent to the system RA<ε₀ of ramified analysis up to ε₀. (shrink)

Ernst Mayr argued that the emergence of biology as a special science in the early nineteenth century was possible due to the demise of the mathematical model of science and its insistence on demonstrative knowledge. More recently, John Zammito has claimed that the rise of biology as a special science was due to a distinctive experimental, anti-metaphysical, anti-mathematical, and anti-rationalist strand of thought coming from outside of Germany. In this paper we argue that this narrative neglects the important role played (...) by the mathematical and axiomatic model of science in the emergence of biology as a special science. We show that several major actors involved in the emergence of biology as a science in Germany were working with an axiomatic conception of science that goes back at least to Aristotle and was popular in mid-eighteenth-century German academic circles due to its endorsement by Christian Wolff. More specifically, we show that at least two major contributors to the emergence of biology in Germany—Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus—sought to provide a conception of the new science of life that satisfies the criteria of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science. Both C.F. Wolff and Treviranus took over strong commitments to the axiomatic model of science from major philosophers of their time, Christian Wolff and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, respectively. The ideal of biology as an axiomatic science with specific biological fundamental concepts and principles thus played a role in the emergence of biology as a special science. (shrink)

We propose two alternatives to Xu’s axiomatization of Chellas’s STIT. The first one simplifies its presentation, and also provides an alternative axiomatization of the deliberative STIT. The second one starts from the idea that the historic necessity operator can be defined as an abbreviation of operators of agency, and can thus be eliminated from the logic of Chellas’s STIT. The second axiomatization also allows us to establish that the problem of deciding the satisfiability of a STIT formula (...) without temporal operators is NP-complete in the single-agent case, and is NEXPTIME-complete in the multiagent case, both for the deliberative and Chellas’s STIT. (shrink)

Definitional and axiomatic theories of truth -- Objects of truth -- Tarski -- Truth and set theory -- Technical preliminaries -- Comparing axiomatic theories of truth -- Disquotation -- Classical compositional truth -- Hierarchies -- Typed and type-free theories of truth -- Reasons against typing -- Axioms and rules -- Axioms for type-free truth -- Classical symmetric truth -- Kripke-Feferman -- Axiomatizing Kripke's theory in partial logic -- Grounded truth -- Alternative evaluation schemata -- Disquotation -- Classical logic -- Deflationism (...) -- Reflection -- Ontological reduction -- Applying theories of truth. (shrink)

We present an axiomatization of non-relativistic Quantum Mechanics for a system with an arbitrary number of components. The interpretation of our system of axioms is realistic and objective. The EPR paradox and its relation with realism is discussed in this framework. It is shown that there is no contradiction between realism and recent experimental results.

In the literature, different axiomatizations of Public Announcement Logic (PAL) have been proposed. Most of these axiomatizations share a “core set” of the so-called “reduction axioms”. In this paper, by designing non-standard Kripke semantics for the language of PAL, we show that the proof system based on this core set of axioms does not completely axiomatize PAL without additional axioms and rules. In fact, many of the intuitive axioms and rules we took for granted could not be derived from the (...) core set. Moreover, we also propose and advocate an alternative yet meaningful axiomatization of PAL without the reduction axioms. The completeness is proved directly by a detour method using the canonical model where announcements are treated as merely labels for modalities as in normal modal logics. This new axiomatization and its completeness proof may sharpen our understanding of PAL and can be adapted to other dynamic epistemic logics. (shrink)

We employ the lens provided by formal truth theory to study axiomatizations of Peano Arithmetic ${\textsf {(PA)}}$. More specifically, let Elementary Arithmetic ${\textsf {(EA)}}$ be the fragment $\mathsf {I}\Delta _0 + \mathsf {Exp}$ of ${\textsf {PA}}$, and let ${\textsf {CT}}^-[{\textsf {EA}}]$ be the extension of ${\textsf {EA}}$ by the commonly studied axioms of compositional truth ${\textsf {CT}}^-$. We investigate both local and global properties of the family of first order theories of the form ${\textsf {CT}}^-[{\textsf {EA}}] +\alpha $, where $\alpha (...) $ is a particular way of expressing “ ${\textsf {PA}}$ is true” (using the truth predicate). Our focus is dominantly on two types of axiomatizations, namely: (1) schematic axiomatizations that are deductively equivalent to ${\textsf {PA}}$ and (2) axiomatizations that are proof-theoretically equivalent to the canonical axiomatization of ${\textsf {PA}}$. (shrink)

This work treats the problem of axiomatizing the truth and falsity consequence relations, $ \vDash _t $ and $ \vDash _f $, determined via truth and falsity orderings on the trilattice SIXTEEN₃. The approach is based on a representation of SIXTEEN₃ as a twist-structure over the two-element Boolean algebra.

Axiomatic rationality is defined in terms of conformity to abstract axioms. Savage limited axiomatic rationality to small worlds, that is, situations in which the exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of future states S and their consequences C are known. Others have interpreted axiomatic rationality as a categorical norm for how human beings should reason, arguing in addition that violations would lead to real costs such as money pumps. Yet a review of the literature shows little evidence that violations are actually (...) associated with any measurable costs. Limiting axiomatic rationality to small worlds, I propose a naturalized version of rationality for situations of intractability and uncertainty, all of which are not in. In these situations, humans can achieve their goals by relying on heuristics that may violate axiomatic rationality. The study of ecological rationality requires formal models of heuristics and an analysis of the structures of environments these can exploit. It lays the foundation of a moderate naturalism in epistemology, providing statements about heuristics we should use in a given situation. Unlike axiomatic rationality, ecological rationality can explain less-is-more effects, formalize when one should move from ‘is’ to ‘ought,’ and be evaluated by goals beyond coherence, such as predictive accuracy, frugality, and efficiency. Ecological rationality can be seen as a formalization of means–end instrumentalist rationality, based on Herbert Simon’s insight that rational behavior is a function of the mind and its environment. (shrink)

This is part one of a two-part paper, in which we develop an axiomatic theory of the relation of partial ground. The main novelty of the paper is the of use of a binary ground predicate rather than an operator to formalize ground. This allows us to connect theories of partial ground with axiomatic theories of truth. In this part of the paper, we develop an axiomatization of the relation of partial ground over the truths of arithmetic and show (...) that the theory is a proof-theoretically conservative extension of the theory PT of positive truth. We construct models for the theory and draw some conclusions for the semantics of conceptualist ground. (shrink)

According to the analysis of concessive conditionals suggested by Crupi and Iacona, a concessive conditional \(p{{\,\mathrm{\hookrightarrow }\,}}q\) is adequately formalized as a conjunction of conditionals. This paper presents a sound and complete axiomatic system for concessive conditionals so understood. The soundness and completeness proofs that will be provided rely on a method that has been employed by Raidl, Iacona, and Crupi to prove the soundness and completeness of an analogous system for evidential conditionals.

Axiomatization is uncommon outside mathematics, partly for being often viewed as embalming, partly because the best-known axiomatizations have serious shortcomings, and partly because it has had only one eminent champion, namely David Hilbert. The aims of this paper are to describe what will be called dual axiomatics, for it concerns not just the formalism, but also the meaning of the key concepts; and to suggest that every instance of dual axiomatics presupposes some philosophical view or other. To illustrate these (...) points, a theory of solidarity will be crafted and axiomatized, and certain controversies in both classical and quantum physics, as well as in the philosophy of mind, will be briefly discussed. The upshot of this paper is that dual axiomatics, unlike the purely formal axiomatics favored by the structuralists school, is not a luxury but a tool helping resolve some scientific controversies. (shrink)

We discuss the axiomatization of generalized consequence relations determined by non-deterministic matrices. We show that, under reasonable expressiveness requirements, simple axiomatizations can always be obtained, using inference rules which can have more than one conclusion. Further, when the non-deterministic matrices are finite we obtain finite axiomatizations with a suitable generalized subformula property.

We give a sound and complete axiomatization for the full computation tree logic, CTL*, of R-generable models. This solves a long standing open problem in branching time temporal logic.

Boolean connexive logic is an extension of Boolean logic that is closed under Modus Ponens and contains Aristotle’s and Boethius’ theses. According to these theses a sentence cannot imply its negation and the negation of a sentence cannot imply the sentence; and if the antecedent implies the consequent, then the antecedent cannot imply the negation of the consequent and if the antecedent implies the negation of the consequent, then the antecedent cannot imply the consequent. Such a logic was first introduced (...) by Jarmużek and Malinowski, by means of so-called relating semantics and tableau systems. Subsequently its modal extension was determined by means of the combination of possible-worlds semantics and relating semantics. In the following article we present axiomatic systems of some basic and modal Boolean connexive logics. Proofs of completeness will be carried out using canonical models defined with respect to maximal consistent sets. (shrink)

The basis of a rigorous formal axiomatization of quantum mechanics is constructed, built upon Dirac's bra-ket notation. The system is three-sorted, with separate variables for scalars, vectors and operators. First-order quantification over all three types of variable is permitted. Economy in the axioms is effected by, e.g., assigning a single logical function * to transform (i) a scalar into its complex conjugate, (ii) a ket vector into a bra and a bra into a ket, (iii) an operator into its (...) adjoint. The system is accompanied by a formal semantics. Further papers will deal with vector subspaces and projection operators, operators with continuous spectra, tensor products, observables, and quantum mechanical probabilities. (shrink)

Axiomatic Formal Ontology is a fairly comprehensive systematic treatise on general metaphysics. The axiomatic method is applied throughout the book. Its main theme is the construction of a general non-set-theoretical theory of intensional entities. Other important matters discussed are the metaphysics of modality, the nature of actual existence, mereology and the taxonomy of entities.

Following recent developments in the literature on axiomatic theories of truth, we investigate an alternative to the widespread habit of formalizing the syntax of the object-language into the object-language itself. We first argue for the proposed revision, elaborating philosophical evidences in favor of it. Secondly, we present a general framework for axiomatic theories of truth with theories of syntax. Different choices of the object theory O will be considered. Moreover, some strengthenings of these theories will be introduced: we will consider (...) extending the theories by the addition of coding axioms or by extending the schemas of O, if present, to the entire vocabulary of our theory of truth. Finally, we touch on the philosophical consequences that the theories described can have on the debate about the metaphysical status of the truth predicate and on the formalization of our informal metatheoretic reasoning. (shrink)

This article develops an axiomatic theory of induction that speaks to the recent debate on Bayesian orgulity. It shows the exact principles associated with the belief that data can corroborate universal laws. We identify two types of disbelief about induction: skepticism that the existence of universal laws of nature can be determined empirically, and skepticism that the true law of nature, if it exists, can be successfully identified. We formalize and characterize these two dispositions toward induction by introducing novel axioms (...) for subjective probabilities. We also relate these dispositions to the axiom of σ-additivity. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the question of how aspects of science have been perceived through history. In particular, I will discuss how the contribution of axiomatics to the development of science and mathematics was viewed in 20th century philosophy of science and philosophy of mathematics. It will turn out that in connection with scientific methodology, in particular regarding its use in the context of discovery, axiomatics has received only very little attention. This is a rather surprising result, since (...) axiomatizations have been employed extensively in mathematics, science, and also by the philosophers themselves. (shrink)

In a recent paper Berto introduces a semantic system for a logic of imagination, intended as positive conceivability, and aboutness of imaginative acts. This system crucially adopts elements of both the semantics of conditionals and the semantics of analytical implications in order to account for the central logical traits of the notion of truth in an act of imagination based on an explicit input. The main problem left unsolved is to put forward a complete set of axioms for the proposed (...) system. In the present paper I offer a solution to this problem by providing a complete axiomatization of a generalization of the original semantics. The difficulty in proving completeness lies in the fact that the modalities that capture the notion of truth in an act of imagination are neither standard nor minimal, so that the construction of the canonical model and the proof of the truth lemma are to be substantially modified. (shrink)

A realistic axiomatic formulation of Galilean Quantum Field Theories is presented, from which the most important theorems of the theory can be deduced. In comparison with others formulations, the formal aspect has been improved by the use of certain mathematical theories, such as group theory and the theory of rigged Hilbert spaces. Our approach regards the fields as real things with symmetry properties. The general structure is analyzed and contrasted with relativistic theories.

The task of axiomatizing physical theories has attracted, in recent years, some interest among both empirical scientists and logicians. However, the axiomatizations produced by either one of these two groups seldom appear satisfactory to the members of the other. It is the purpose of this paper to develop an approach that will satisfy the criteria of both, hence permit us to construct axiomatizations that will meet simultaneously the standards and needs of logicians and of empirical scientists.

This is part two of a two-part paper in which we develop an axiomatic theory of the relation of partial ground. The main novelty of the paper is the of use of a binary ground predicate rather than an operator to formalize ground. In this part of the paper, we extend the base theory of the first part of the paper with hierarchically typed truth-predicates and principles about the interaction of partial ground and truth. We show that our theory is (...) a proof-theoretically conservative extension of the ramified theory of positive truth up to. (shrink)

Formal aspects of various ways of description of Jan Łukasiewicz’s four-valued modal logic £ are discussed. The original Łukasiewicz’s description by means of the accepted and rejected theorems, together with the four-valued matrix, is presented. Then the improved E.J. Lemmon’s description based upon three specific axioms, together with the relational semantics, is presented as well. It is proved that Lemmon’s axiomatic is not independent: one axiom is derivable on the base of the remanent two. Several axiomatizations, based on three, two (...) or one single axiom are provided and discussed, including S. Kripke’s axiomatics. It is claimed that (a) all substitutions of classical theorems, (b) the rule of modus ponens, (c) the definition of “◊” and (d) the single specific axiom schema: ⬜A ∧ B → A ∧ ⬜B, called the jumping necessity axiom, constitute an elegant axiomatics of the system £. (shrink)

A certain type of inference rules in modal logics, generalizing Gabbay's Irreflexivity rule, is introduced and some general completeness results about modal logics axiomatized with such rules are proved.

Abstract:This article explores three distinct approaches to politics identified by Deleuze and Guattari. I argue that they consistently privilege a 'problematic' approach entailing individuals and associations establishing norms on the basis of the potential they possess within a concrete situation, and that this implies resistance to both the 'theorematic' politics they associate with statist philosophy and struggles aiming to alter the 'axiomatic' determination induced by global forces of capital. While this resistance necessarily proceeds in relation to established notions of identity (...) and value, it must also do more than aim for the establishment of particular institutional 'constants,' including particular democratic procedures and human rights. (shrink)

S3o and S4o are the restrictions with the Converse Ackermann Property of the implicative fragments of Lewis' S3 and S4 respectively. The aim of this paper is to provide all possible axiomatizations with independent axioms of S3o and S40 that can be formulated with a modification of Anderson and Belnap's list of valid entailments.

We formulate a Hilbert-style axiomatic system and a tableau calculus for the STIT-based logic of imagination recently proposed in Wansing. Completeness of the axiom system is shown by the method of canonical models; completeness of the tableau system is also shown by using standard methods.

Dependence logic, introduced in Väänänen [11], cannot be axiomatized. However, first-order consequences of dependence logic sentences can be axiomatized, and this is what we shall do in this paper. We give an explicit axiomatization and prove the respective Completeness Theorem.

In the paper a generalised method for obtaining an adequate axiomatic system for any relating logic expressed in the language with Boolean connectives and relating implication, determined by the limited positive relational properties is studied. The method of defining axiomatic systems for logics of a given type is called an algorithm since the analysis allows for any logic determined by the limited positive relational properties to define the adequate axiomatic system automatically, step-by-step. We prove in the paper that the algorithm (...) really works and we show how it can be applied to BLRI. (shrink)

1 Choice conjecture In axiomatizing nonclassical extensions of classical sentential logic one tries to make do, if one can, with adding to classical sentential logic a finite number of axiom schemes of the simplest kind and a finite number of inference rules of the simplest kind. The simplest kind of axiom scheme in effect states of a particular formula P that for any substitution of formulas for atoms the result of its application to P is to count as an axiom. (...) The simplest kind of onepremise inference rule in effect states of a particular pair of formulas P and Q that for any substitution of formulas for atoms, if the result of its application to P is a theorem, then the result of its application to Q is to count as a theorem; similarly for many-premise rules. Such are the schemes and rules of all the best-known modal and tense logics, for instance. Sometimes it is difficult to find such simple schemes and rules. In that case one may resort to less simple schemes or less simple rules. There is no generally recognized rigorous definition of "next simplest kind" of scheme. Neither is there any generally recognized definition of "next simplest kind" of rule, and hence there is no fully rigorous enunciation of the choice conjecture, the conjecture that schemes of the next simplest kind can always be avoided in favor of rules of the next simplest kind and vice versa. Nonetheless, there are cases where intuitively one does recognize that the schemes or rules in a given axiomatization are only slightly more complex than the simplest kind, including cases where one does have a choice between adopting slightly-more-complex-than-simplest schemes and adopting slightly-more-complex-than-simplest rules. In tense logic early examples of slightly more complex rules are found in [2] and [3] : there is one example of the embarrassed use of such rules in the former, and many examples of the enthusiastic use of such rules in the latter and its sequels. Accordingly the rules in question have come to be called "Gabbay-style" rules. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the modal logic with both \ and \ arising from Kripke models with a crisp accessibility and whose propositions are valued over the standard Gödel algebra \. We provide an axiomatic system extending the one from Caicedo and Rodriguez :37–55, 2015) for models with a valued accessibility with Dunn axiom from positive modal logics, and show it is strongly complete with respect to the intended semantics. The axiomatizations of the most usual frame restrictions are given (...) too. We also prove that in the studied logic it is not possible to get \ as an abbreviation of \, nor vice-versa, showing that indeed the axiomatic system we present does not coincide with any of the mono-modal fragments previously axiomatized in the literature. (shrink)

Shortest possible axiomatizations for the implicational fragments of the modal logics S4 and S5 are reported. Among these axiomatizations is included a shortest single axiom for implicational S4—which to our knowledge is the first reported single axiom for that system—and several new shortest single axioms for implicational S5. A variety of automated reasoning strategies were essential to our discoveries.

We discuss the interplay between the axiomatic and the semantic approach to truth. Often, semantic constructions have guided the development of axiomatic theories and certain axiomatic theories have been claimed to capture a semantic construction. We ask under which conditions an axiomatic theory captures a semantic construction. After discussing some potential criteria, we focus on the criterion of ℕ-categoricity and discuss its usefulness and limits.

We give a Hilbert style axiomatization for the set of formulas in the temporal language with Until and Since which are valid over the real number flow of time. The axiomatization, which is orthodox in the sense of only having the usual temporal rules of inference, is complete with respect to single formulas.

We investigate under what conditions a given set of collective judgments can arise from a specific voting procedure. In order to answer this question, we introduce a language similar to modal logic for reasoning about judgment aggregation procedures. In this language, the formula expresses that is collectively accepted, or that is a group judgment based on voting. Different judgment aggregation procedures may be underlying the group decision making. Here we investigate majority voting, where holds if a majority of individuals accepts, (...) consensus voting, where holds if all individuals accept, and dictatorship. We provide complete axiomatizations for judgment sets arising from all three aggregation procedures. (shrink)

We present a faithful axiomatization of von Mises' notion of a random sequence, using an abstract independence relation. A byproduct is a quantifier elimination theorem for Friedman's "almost all" quantifier in terms of this independence relation.

A realistic axiomatic formulation of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics for a single microsystem with spin is presented, from which the most important theorems of the theory can be deduced. In comparison with previous formulations, the formal aspect has been improved by the use of certain mathematical theories, such as the theory of equipped spaces, and group theory. The standard formalism is naturally obtained from the latter, starting from a central primitive concept: the Galilei group.

This work treats the problem of axiomatizing the truth and falsity consequence relations, ⊨ t and ⊨ f, determined via truth and falsity orderings on the trilattice SIXTEEN 3 (Shramko and Wansing, 2005). The approach is based on a representation of SIXTEEN 3 as a twist-structure over the two-element Boolean algebra.