Abstract

The aim of this thesis is a defence of Part II of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, "Of the ideas of space and time." These sections are generally considered to be uncharacteristically illogical, badly-reasoned, and un-Humean. It is contended here that the sections are in fact perfectly satisfactory when understood properly. It is first necessary to make explicit a premiss that is implicit in Hume's arguments: that to have an idea is to have in the mind an experience of the same sort as that of the impression giving rise to the idea. Thus, an idea of something seen--for example, a square--will be an image of a square. When Hume's arguments are read in this light, so that Hume's discussion of the idea of a line or point is equivalent to a discussion of pictures of lines and points, it is more apparent that his arguments are founded on reasoning. However, it is also necessary to understand Hume's particular approach to reasoning and the production of belief. Hume denies that there can be any certainty in demonstrative reasoning, and also argues that in any event, belief is not produced by reason, but rather by the effect of habit on the imagination