Abstract

Being a realist about a given domain, I suggest, is a matter of accepting the claims that belong to that domain, while an anti-realist about a given domain is someone who isn't a realist about it. I argue that this conception, despite its simplicity, explains what unifies the diverse positions labelled 'anti-realist'. Further, on this conception, it is unsurprising that philosophers often disagree about which positions are anti-realist. I proceed to consider whether there is such a thing as a global anti-realist, someone who isn't a realist about anything. I first examine several views which suggest that there is no uniquely correct way to "divide the world into objects". Philosophers of this persuasion, I argue, aren't forced to regard themselves as global anti-realists. Nevertheless, they are properly regarded as such by someone who links existential claims to claims about how reality would most perspicuously be described. I go on to examine several positions which are anti-realist with regard to semantic and intentional notions like reference, meaning, and belief. Again, I argue that the proponent of such a view isn't forced to see herself as a global anti-realist. But a realist about semantics and intentionality, I claim, has no other choice. The work concludes with some tentative findings on the relation between epistemic theories of truth and anti-realism.