Abstract

An analysis of Hegel's prohibition of slavery provides access to elements of the concept of the individual in the Philosophy of Right. To prevent the claims of property from justifying at least some forms of slavery, Hegel implicitly employs a distinction among the categories of things which can be possessed. Objects of the will , a category which Hegel explicitly formulates, can become property. Restricted objects of the will, a category which Hegel employs but does not explicitly formulate or acknowledge, are always already possessed by the self, and cannot become objects of property. The natural self--the body and its abilities--is clearly a restricted object of the will. ;An analysis of several mediating processes of civil society, including the system of needs and Bildung, shows that the possessive relation which exists between the self and its restricted objects of the will constitutes a moment of particularity and self- interest which is never sublated. A gap is thus introduced into the argument of the Philosophy of Right. A concept of the individual which is ultimately atomistic and possessive characterizes the argument of the sections on abstract right and civil society. A non- atomistic, constitutive concept of the individual underlies Hegel's notion of the citizen. Hegel never reconciles these concepts. Thus, that portion of the Philosophy of Right characterized by the ;possessive concept of the individual remains more fully within the limits of liberal individualism than is generally acknowledged. ; *All degree requirements completed in 1984, but degree will be granted in 1985