Observing and what it entails

Philosophy of Science 38 (3):415-417 (1971)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the preceding article, [3], Peter Machamer states three objections to my recent attempt to define ‘observation term’. While I believe that all Machamer's objections are mistaken, as I will try to show, his discussion does touch on two problems which have forced revisions. Both his first and second objections are that my definition is too restrictive because its second necessary condition for a term ‘O‘ being an observation term rules out too many terms which are obviously observation terms. The condition is :For any term, 'P' if 'There is an O ' entails the statement, 'There is a P-thing', then ‘Under certain conditions, some P-thing would appear as P to any standard observer’ is true.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,532

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
168 (#113,925)

6 months
13 (#189,362)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

A note on a definition of 'observation term'.Philip A. Ostien - 1975 - Philosophy of Science 42 (2):203-207.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Phenomenalism.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - In Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press. pp. 60-105.
Sellars, scientific realism, and sensa.James W. Cornman - 1970 - Review of Metaphysics 23 (3):417-51.

Add more references