Equal Desires and Self-Control

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Self-control requires intentionally resisting what we most want to do. Yet we do what we most want to do, if we do anything intentionally at that time (The Law of Desire). Therefore, self-control is impossible. So runs a well-studied puzzle. The three standard accounts assume that if a desire is our strongest desire, then it is stronger than all others. But that assumption is false. For we may have desires of equal strength. I describe cases which feature tied desires, self-control, and doing what we most want to do. Following insights from computer science (Buridan’s Principle), equal-strength desires are possible any time we try to decide. My proposal may also be used to bolster all three standard analyses.

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Daniel Coren
Seattle University

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