Abstract

The central aim of this dissertation is to investigate the kind of information that is available to us through empirical observation of the world. Apart from the appeal that such an investigation has in itself, the investigation is motivated by the difficulties that are encountered in the interpretation of modern physics. It is my belief that we can only reach an adequate understanding of empirical theories, and the relation between mathematics and the world in general, if we first come to an adequate understanding of the kind of information upon which such theories are based. I begin my investigation with the assumption that there is an external world that is distinct from the experiences of observers. I then assume, with a little argument, a causal theory of perception according to which the fundamental relation between the world and experience is a causal relation. From this starting point I argue for the following claims: Perception can provide knowledge about the causal-dispositional nature of the world. In particular, I argue, we need not be too worried by sceptical arguments involving such devices as evil demons, dreams, and illusions. In a sense, our knowledge of the world does not go beyond the causal structure of the world. Knowledge of causal structure alone is enough to account for the rich, precise, and accurate theories of the world that are exemplified in modern science. In defence of this last claim, I provide an explicit interpretation of Spatial Geometry, Special Relativity, and Classical Electromagnetism in terms of causal structure alone