Emotion as Perception: The Cognitive Role of Emotion

Dissertation, Cornell University (1989)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that emotions are analogous to sense perceptions insofar as both convey information about the external world. Sense perceptions possess the ability to carry information about the world because they are caused in a regular way by the world, and the same should be true of emotions. In order to establish the analogy, I discuss critically both the assumptions about knowledge and perception and the assumptions about emotion that underlie the widespread view that emotions could not possibly carry information. It is both natural and reasonable to see the emotions as a means for gaining knowledge about the external world. ;Chapter 1. Reliabilist theories of knowledge and causal theories of perception provide the context in which I develop my theory of emotions. The most commonly accepted causal theories of perception--information-flow theories--must be amended in order to give greater weight to the qualitative element of perception and to make room for perception sometimes to be inferential. Since emotional perception is both qualitative and often inferential, these points are important to establishing my claims about the emotions. ;Chapter 2. Here I develop the analogy between emotion and perception. I discuss the theories of Descartes and Hume as well as contemporary cognitive theories of emotion; my view of emotion takes certain points from both the traditional and the contemporary view, but is not identical to either. Emotions are complex mental states that can involve both feeling and thought, buy they should not be identified with beliefs. There are various disanalogies between emotion and perception, but these do not prevent the emotions from providing knowledge. ;Chapter 3. Here I provide an empirical argument in defense of emotion-based knowing, consisting of an extensive discussion of examples drawn from experience, literature, and imagination. The examples cover a wide variety of situations in order to show the extent to which the emotions permeate knowledge. The examples, taken together, make it almost impossible to deny that our emotions provide us knowledge about the external world

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Emotion, perception and perspective.Julien A. Deonna - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (1):29–46.
Self-deception about emotion.Lisa Damm - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):254-270.
Explaining action by emotion.Sabine A. Döring - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.
True emotions.Mikko Salmela - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):382-405.
Emotion, Moral Perception, and Character.Charles B. Starkey - 2001 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
Emotion and action.Jing Zhu & Paul Thagard - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):19 – 36.
Emotion: Something More Than Feelings.Allyson Lee Robichaud - 1997 - Dissertation, City University of New York

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-04

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references