Abstract

Recent work in the philosophy of religion has recast traditional arguments for the existence of God into a "cumulative case" argument which provides good, but not conclusive, grounds for believing that God exists. Drawing parallels with scientific methodology, this has often involved offering an argument to the best explanation of the world's existence and nature. ;I explore the underlying methodology here, and defend the propriety of using inferences to the best explanation in metaphysical contexts. Chapter 1 argues that central to a religious doctrinal system are philosophical claims, and that assessing those philosophical commitments is one important way of evaluating the reasonableness of religious beliefs. Chapter 2 then sets forth one way in which that assessment can occur, employing criteria of assessment that are shared by all philosophical systems. Such criteria arise from the nature of the project: to provide an understanding of reality that accounts for, or explains, our experiences of the world around us. ;Chapter 3 discusses two approaches drawing explicit parallels between philosophy of science and philosophy of religion, preferring the confirmation theory approach of Richard Swinburne and George Schlesinger to the interpretational approach of Ian Barbour. Though Schlesinger's explication has serious flaws, Swinburne's is worth exploring further. In chapter 4 I consider, and reject, the objections that religion is inaccessible , that science is inapplicable , and that any merging of the two is inappropriate . ;Chapter 5 provides an account of explanation, as involving information answering some question which could have been asked about a given aspect of some event or state of affairs, which does not preclude an examination of the claim that God is explanatorily related to the world. Then, in chapter 6, I provide an extended account of arguing to the best explanation and defend it against important objections. I conclude that this method of abductive reasoning provides a way of arriving at reasonable beliefs not only about the world in which we live, but--potentially--about that which lies behind it