Can the Eleatic Principle be Justified?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):313-335 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Eleatic Principle or causal criterion is a causal test that entities must pass in order to gain admission to some philosophers’ ontology.1 This principle justifies belief in only those entities to which causal power can be attributed, that is, to those entities which can bring about changes in the world. The idea of such a test is rather important in modern ontology, since it is neither without intuitive appeal nor without influential supporters. Its supporters have included David Armstrong (1978, Vol 2, 5), Brian Ellis (1990, 22) and Hartry Field2 (1989, 68) to name but a few.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,628

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification.Michael Huemer - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:329-340.
Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification.Michael Huemer - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:329--340.
How to set a surprise exam.Ned Hall - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):647-703.
A paradox of justified believing.Colin Cheyne - 2009 - Ratio 22 (3):278-290.
Credence in the Image of Chance.Michael Caie - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):626-648.
Armstrong on the eleatic principle and abstract entities.Graham Oddie - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (2):285 - 295.
How to Be an Eleatic Monist.Michael C. Rea - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):129-151.
Self‐supporting Arguments.Andrew D. Cling - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):279-303.
Unmoved: A Rejoinder to Emily Thomas.Thomas M. Lennon - 2015 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (4):763-774.
Plato, Aristotle, and the purpose of politics.Kevin M. Cherry - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Self-supporting arguments.Andrew D. Cling - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):279–303.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-31

Downloads
530 (#34,413)

6 months
22 (#121,654)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark Colyvan
University of Sydney

Citations of this work

What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?Marc Lange - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):485-511.
The Narrow Ontic Counterfactual Account of Distinctively Mathematical Explanation.Mark Povich - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):511-543.
There is No Easy Road to Nominalism.M. Colyvan - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):285-306.
Ordinary objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Ineffability of Induction.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):129-149.

View all 40 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
From a Logical Point of View.Richard M. Martin - 1955 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (4):574-575.
Realism, Mathematics, and Modality.Hartry Field - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.
On the Plurality of Worlds.Allen Stairs - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):333-352.

View all 35 references / Add more references