Abstract

The current debate in feminist ethics over justice and care raises questions about the self: Are we fundamentally connected to or separate from others?--and morality: Is morality essentially a matter of universal principles, of rights and obligations, or of caring for particular others? I argue for an integration of justice and care, based on a conception of the self as both connected and separate, a self partially constituted by relationships. I consider the implications of such an ethic for family life, examining issues such as equality and autonomy within the family, children's rights, and the duty of family members to care for one another. The model of the family I defend is at once individualistic and--especially--communal, resting on both justice and a duty to care. ;It is also a liberal-feminist model. The conception of justice predominant in the justice-care debate is a liberal one. I argue that liberalism provides a strong foundation for sex equality, and show why charges that liberalism is inherently patriarchal are inaccurate. I also argue that liberalism can accommodate care ethics, that indeed some liberal thinkers long ago offered conceptions of the self and morality which point to an integration of justice and care. ;I begin with an examination of the thought of three distinguished liberal theorists from the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries: John Locke, Mary Wollstonecraft, and John Stuart Mill. I focus on their views on human nature, morality, sex equality, and the family. I then consider arguments being made by contemporary philosophers engaged in the justice-care debate, and offer a vision of integration. Finally, I apply this ethical vision to family life, attempting to create a model which is at once feminist, compassionate, and just