Contextualism and Interest-Relative Invariantism

In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum. pp. 199 (2012)
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Abstract

Classical Invariantism (CI): The truth-value of a given knowledge-ascribing (-denying) sentence is (a) invariant across conversational contexts and (b) independent of how important it is to the subject (S) that the relevant proposition (P) be true.

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E. J. Coffman
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

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