Abstract

The dissertation examines the structure of Aristotle's ethical theory in Nicomachean Ethics from an "ethics of virtue" approach which challenges the dominant contemporary metaethical schemes made popular by Rawls . The "species-based" ethics of virtue utilized affirms that a developed psychology is largely determinative for providing ethical norms and values. In particular, it insists that concepts of moral virtue and the morally worthy person are fundamental to explaining concepts of morality and ethical value. In turn, this account of moral virtue is derived from standards of evaluation taken from psychology and an account of the characteristic human function and mode of life. The dissertation specifically investigates whether Aristotle distinguishes the healthy person from the dysfunctional person by means of standards of evaluation which rely solely upon his function argument and not upon any prior ethical theory. ;I argue that Aristotle affirms at least the more modest approach to standards of evaluation in which an account of the characteristic human function is capable of isolating the bad or morally defective individual from all others. Aristotle believes that moral defect is the result of non-rational feelings adversely conditioning persons in such a way that their practical reason fails to function characteristically in wish. Specifically, this adverse conditioning of wish is understood in terms of feelings either corrupting or--as I argue--supplanting practical reason's characteristic function of providing ends of action . This miswish, in turn, limits the base person's scope of deliberation and decision to non-rational ends. Thus, base persons in some sense fail to participate in their characteristic human function in a morally relevant manner. ;Investigating Nicomachean Ethics from the perspective of a species-based ethics of virtue helps reveal the nature of Aristotle's type of ethical naturalism which contemporary metaethical categories tend to obscure rather than illumine. This investigation also exposes certain controversial elements which must be addressed by any contemporary ethics of virtue endeavoring to be consistent with this aristotelian type of ethical naturalism.