Inclinazioni naturali: natura umana e prospettiva in prima persona tra tomismo e filosofia analitica

Dissertation, University of Trieste and University of Udine (2024)
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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to show the relevance that Aquinas's theory of natural inclinations can play in the contemporary debate for the inquiry on human flourishing, which consists in the realisation of the proper end that human beings have as human beings. We will engage in dialogue with several authors, belonging to the analytic tradition (Elizabeth Anscombe, John Finnis, Ralph McInerny, Anthony Lisska) or, nevertheless, culturally close to it (Alasdair MacIntyre), who have reconsidered the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas in the contemporary debate in order to inquire what enables human flourishing. We will argue that the proper consideration of natural inclinations leads, on the one hand, to overcome the problems posed by Hume's law by identifying human nature as a normative criterion common to all human beings, and, on the other hand, to recognise the role of the first-person perspective in identifying what enables the human flourishing of each agent. Natural inclinations do not express agents' psychological preferences, but consist in the fact that human beings naturally tend towards the realisation of their nature as a good to be realised. In order to flourish, human beings are required to act in accordance with their natural inclinations, since natural inclinations are tendencies that human beings have towards a set of goods that are grounded in human nature. Revisiting a recent proposal put forward by Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum in the field of analytic metaphysics, we will argue that agents develop a virtuous conduct if and only if they act in accordance with their natural inclinations; in doing so, they flourish as human beings, that is, they actualise the powers they have by virtue of their nature. However, human beings are not strictly necessitated to act in accordance with their natural inclinations. Indeed, in order to flourish, agents should also recognise, by virtue of their rational capacities, that acting in accordance with their natural inclinations is a reason for acting for them and they should act in accordance with these reasons. Furthermore, we will argue that there is no single way to flourish for all human beings, because, although flourishing requires that human beings act in accordance with their nature, nevertheless, the way in which agents can flourish varies according to their individual characteristics and according to the circumstances and contexts in which they act, that is, according to the practices in which they participate in their lived experience. In the last part of this thesis, we will test the theoretical proposal developed in the previous parts through a critical analysis of Alasdair MacIntyre's thought.

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References found in this work

After virtue: a study in moral theory.Alasdair C. MacIntyre - 1981 - Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
A treatise of human nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1969 - Harmondsworth,: Penguin Books. Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner.
Principia ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. Edited by Thomas Baldwin.
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?Alasdair C. MacIntyre - 1988 - University of Notre Dame Press.

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