“Yes, the Whole Approach Is Questionable, Yes, False”: Phenomenology and the New Realism

Journal of Speculative Philosophy 32 (3):450-461 (2018)
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Abstract

If the end of metaphysics is not upon us, then phenomenology must be at an end instead. Or so we are told, at least, by the “new realists,” or at least by some of the thinkers I’ll refer to using this term. And why shouldn’t we agree with them? If there’s anything at all to be said for the line of thinking that they advance, then today, we are at long last licensed to speak about beings once again; but apparently, phenomenology deals only with consciousness, which we must admit—assuming we have a realist bone in our bodies—does not determine beings themselves at all. To persist with the phenomenological method, rather, would be to block all progress in philosophy—or so, again, some of these “new realists” will...

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