Determinism and our self-conception [Book Review]

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):242-250 (2009)
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Abstract

This paper is a contribution to a symposium on John Fischer's MY WAY. In much of that work, Fischer says, he aims to show the "resiliency of our fundamental conception of ourselves as possessing control and being morally responsible agents," and particularly the compatibility of that conception with determinism. I argue that his conclusions leave several important aspects of our ordinary conception of our agency hostage to determinism. Further, there is significant tension between certain of his views. I’ll suggest that our self-conception might be resilient in some ways that receive little emphasis from Fischer, and that it might need alteration in some unacknowledged respects.

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Randolph Clarke
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Free Will Skeptics Can Have Their Basic Desert and Eat It Too.Leigh Vicens - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1:1-12.

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