Intuition, Orthodoxy, and Moral Responsibility

Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):179-199 (2016)
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Abstract

Many Christian philosophers hold that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism, a thesis known as incompatibilism. But there are good reasons for resisting this trend. To illustrate this, I first examine an innovative recent case for incompatibilism by a Christian philosopher, one that depends crucially on the claim that intuitions favor incompatibilism. I argue that the case is flawed in ways that should keep us from accepting its conclusions. I then argue for a shift in the way that this issue is often approached, namely, that Christian philosophers should deemphasize the role of intuitions in illuminating this topic, and take pragmatic considerations concerning orthodoxy and potential empirical discoveries to favor a kind of agnosticism about the compatibility of determinism and responsibility.

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Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.

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