Experiential holism in time

Mind and Language 37 (4):619-637 (2022)
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Abstract

Temporally extended experiences, experiential holists have it, are not reducible to successions of their temporal parts because some whole experiences determine their parts (in some way). This paper suggests, first, that some forms of experiential holism are in fact consistent with the rival atomist view (that experiences are successions of their parts) and, second, that the main reasons advanced for experiential holism are compatible with atomism too. The paper then looks at how holistic determination of its parts by a whole experience might take place in time, arguing that it is either inconsistent or undermines widespread assumptions regarding the mechanisms underlying experiences.

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Philippe Chuard
Southern Methodist University

Citations of this work

Experiential parts.Philippe Chuard - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
Visual Asynchrony & Temporally Extended Contents.Philippe Chuard - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.

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