In Defense of the Resampling Account of Replication

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 43 (4):249–251 (2023)
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Abstract

Matarese (2022) argued in a commentary that Machery’s (2020) resampling account of replication (RAR) is unsatisfactory because it was too quick to abolish the distinction between direct and conceptual replications. Although Matarese agrees with Machery that some interpretations of conceptual replications are misconceived, she offers an interpretation which purports to show that direct and conceptual replications have different functions, and this justifies preserving the distinction. In this commentary, I will defend the RAR from Matarese’s argument. Most importantly, I will argue that Matarese’s interpretation of conceptual replications is conceptually impossible. Thus, I conclude that the direct–conceptual distinction was rightly abolished by Machery.

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Hong Hui Choi
University of Pittsburgh

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References found in this work

Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions.J. R. Stroop - 1935 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 18 (6):643.
What Is a Replication?Edouard Machery - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (4):545-567.
Against the resampling account of replication.Vera Matarese - 2023 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 43 (2):108-115.

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