Abstract

In the fragments of Parmenides, a goddess tells a human of the "roads of inquiry there are for conceiving", and rehearses arguments to show why to eon must be said and taken to be a certain way, on or for an apparently viable road of inquiry. These arguments invoke ike, nanke, and oi ra--roughly, ustice, ecessity, and air Portion--as binding to eon. There is no evidence that the goddess speaks of how to eon might be independent of inquiry, or across all contexts. ;I show that in order for inquiry to be possible, to eon must be taken to be as the goddess says it must on or for that last road of inquiry; and that ike, nanke, and oi ra as understood in the fifth century BCE can be seen to bind to eon to be that way. Paradoxes arise from this, in that what is needed in order to conduct an inquiry and in order to make the arguments the goddess does are incompatible with the way to eon must be taken to be in or for inquiry . I investigate why these paradoxes arise, whether they can be resolved or avoided, and what their significance is with regard to inquiry and to its results. ;I then examine the metaphysical and epistemological ramifications of Parmenides' fragments as thus elucidated, discussing implications for the possibility of inquiry, for conceptions of what is inquired into or sought, and for what inquiry may tell us. I show how the poetic form of the fragments reflects and illuminates these implications, and explore the roles of the human and the divine figures in the fragments. It can thus be seen that this comprehensive approach to the fragments provides a coherent reading of them in a way that others of more limited scope do not. Finally I look at the significance of the posing of inquiry as a problem