Abstract

Theory of reference is a mainstream theory of meanings of certain types of linguistic expressions in contemporary philosophy of language. It assigns corresponding expressions capability to refer to what people are talking or thinking about by using them. Meanwhile it is widely recognized that there are two kinds of reference. One is conceived as a relation between an agent and an entity which he or she applies the term to in particular communicative act ; this is roughly called “speaker’s reference”. Another one characterizes linguistic terms as referring to particular entities relative to particular languages. This is normally identified as semantic reference. The popular hypothesis based on this distinction assumes that if a name is used in communication in a right way then it refers to its semantic referent even when the speaker uses it to refer to something else. On the other hand, some belief that the reference of a particular use of a proper name is fully determined by the speaker’s communicative intentions. In the proposed study both these hypotheses are criticized. Different senses of such words as “designate” or “refer to” in their application to the functioning of linguistic expressions in communication are analyzed, and it is shown that linguistic conventions allegedly responsible for names’ semantic references cannot make names refer to their semantic referents independently on what particular participants of communication are believing or doing. On the other hand, the reduction of the reference of a token of a proper name to its speaker’s reference fails to explain this phenomenon as well. Neither theory explains how tokens of proper names could refer to particular entities. From this at least two conclusions may be made: the radical one would claim that any talk about tokens’ references is most likely meaningless. And the moderate one is that explanations of this phenomenon based on the distinction between semantic and speaker’s references don’t work. The author favors the first conclusion, but does not insist on it.