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What is internalised? Dialogic cognitive representations and the mediated mind
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):698-699 (2005)
Abstract
Two aspects of Tomasello et al.'s account would benefit from further elaboration: (1) the construction of dialogic cognitive representations through social interaction, and (2) the cognitive consequences of operating with such representations. Vygotskian ideas on internalisation and verbal mediation may help us better to understand how dialogic cognitive representations can transform human cognition.Author's Profile
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