Uploading: A Philosophical Analysis

In Russell Blackford & Damien Broderick (eds.), Intelligence Unbound. Wiley. pp. 102–118 (2014-08-11)
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Abstract

This chapter describes three relatively specific forms such as destructive uploading, gradual uploading, and nondestructive uploading. Neuroscience is gradually discovering various neural correlates of consciousness, but this research program largely takes the existence of consciousness for granted. It presents an argument for the pessimistic view and an argument for the optimistic view, both of which run parallel to related arguments that can be given concerning teletransportation. Cryonic technology offers the possibility of preserving our brains in a low‐temperature state shortly after death, until such time as the technology is available to reactivate the brain or perhaps to upload the information in it. Reconstructive uploading from brain scans is closely akin to ordinary (nongradual) uploading from brain scans, with the main difference being the time delay, and perhaps the continued existence in the meantime of the original person.

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David Chalmers
New York University

Citations of this work

May Kantians commit virtual killings that affect no other persons?Tobias Flattery - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (4):751-762.
Uploads, Faxes, and You: Can Personal Identity Be Transmitted?Jonah Goldwater - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3):233–250.
Avatars as Proxies.Paula Sweeney - 2023 - Minds and Machines 33 (3):525-539.
Perfecting agents.Luke Henderson - 2022 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 93 (2):83-105.

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