In this paper, I reply to 18 of the essays on panpsychism in this issue. Along the way, I sketch out what a post-Galilean science of consciousness, one in which consciousness is taken to be a fundamental feature of reality, might look like.

We have various everyday measures for identifying the presence of consciousness, such as the capacity for verbal report and the intentional control of behavior. However, there are many contexts in which these measures are difficult to apply, and even when they can be applied one might have doubts as to their validity in determining the presence/absence of consciousness. Everyday measures for identifying consciousness are particularly problematic when it comes to ‘challenging cases’—human infants, people with brain damage, nonhuman (...) animals, and AI systems. There is a pressing need to identify measures of consciousness that can be applied to challenging cases. This paper explores one of the most promising strategies for identifying and validating such measures—the natural-kind strategy. The paper is in two broad parts. Part I introduces the natural-kind strategy, and contrasts it with other influential approaches in the field. Part II considers a number of objections to the approach, arguing that none succeeds. (shrink)

A Dialogue on Consciousness introduces readers to the debate about consciousness and physicalism, starting with its origins in Descartes, through a lively and entertaining dialogue between unemployed graduate students, who, secretly living in a university library, discuss major theories and quote passages from classic and contemporary texts in search of an answer.

The extended mind thesis prompted philosophers to think about the different shapes our minds can take as they reach beyond our brains and stretch into new technologies. Some of us rely heavily on the environment to scaffold our cognition, reorganizing our homes into rich cognitive niches, for example, or using our smartphones as swiss-army knives for cognition. But the thesis also prompts us to think about other varieties of minds and the unique forms they take. What are we to make (...) of the exotic distributed nervous systems we see in octopuses, for example, or the complex collectives of bees? In this paper, I will argue for a robust version of the extended mind thesis that includes the possibility of extended consciousness. This thesis will open up new ways of understanding the different forms that conscious minds can take, whether human or nonhuman. The thesis will also challenge the popular belief that consciousness exists exclusively in the brain. Furthermore, despite the attention that the extended mind thesis has received, there has been relatively less written about the possibility of extended consciousness. A number of prominent defenders of the extended mind thesis have even called the idea of extended consciousness implausible. I will argue, however, that extended consciousness is a viable theory and it follows from the same ‘parity argument’ that Clark and Chalmers first advanced to support the extended mind thesis. What is more, it may even provide us with a valuable paradigm for how we understand some otherwise puzzling behaviors in certain neurologically abnormal patients as well as in some nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Daniel Dennett’s Consciousness Explained is probably the most widely read book about consciousness ever written by a philosopher. Despite this, the book has had a surprisingly small influence on how most philosophers of mind view consciousness. This might be because many philosophers badly misunderstand the book. They claim it does not even attempt to explain consciousness, but instead denies its very existence. Outside of philosophy the book has had more influence, but is saddled by the same (...) misunderstanding. Now, 30 years after publication, Consciousness Explained deserves reconsideration from anyone interested in consciousness. Here I make a case for this. To start, I will clear up the central misunderstanding of the book. With that done, I will explain and update Dennett’s tantalizing approach to consciousness and the mind. The result brings us very, very close to explaining consciousness. Or so I will argue. (shrink)

The paper argues against the growing tendency to interpret Brentano’s conception of inner consciousness in self-representational terms. This trend has received support from the tendency to see Brentano as a forerunner of contemporary same-order theories of consciousness and from the view that Brentano models intransitive consciousness on transitive consciousness, such that a mental state is conscious insofar as it is aware of itself as an object. However, this reading fails to take into account the Brentanian concept (...) of object, which is ultimately derived from ancient and medieval philosophy, as well as the secondary, elusive character that Brentano attributes to inner perception. According to Brentano, we have an aspectual but transparent consciousness of transcendent objects, whereas our awareness of our own mental acts is always complete but incidental, and ultimately opaque. Reversing the relationship between intentionality and consciousness faces difficulties at the textual interpretative level, but also raises theoretical problems, for it risks treating Brentano’s theory of mind as a form of subjectivism and idealism. (shrink)

A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The (...) three most common answers provided by contemporary philosophy explain the consciousness of value in terms of judgment, emotion, or perception. An alternative view endorsed mainly by authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition argues that values are apprehended by an intentional feeling. In this model, it is by virtue of a feeling that objects are presented as being in different degrees and nuances fair or unfair, boring or funny, good or bad. This paper offers an account of this model of feeling and its basic features, and defends it over alternative models. To this end, the paper discusses different versions of the model circulating in current research which until now have developed in parallel rather than in mutual exchange. The paper also applies the proposed account to the moral domain and examines how a feeling of values is presupposed by several moral experiences. (shrink)

We generally accept that medicine’s conceptual and ethical foundations are grounded in recognition of personhood. With patients in vegetative state, however, we’ve understood that the ethical implications of phenomenal consciousness are distinct from those of personhood. This suggests a need to reconsider medicine’s foundations. What is the role for recognition of consciousness (rather than personhood) in grounding the moral value of medicine and the specific demands of clinical ethics? I suggest that, according to holism, the moral value of (...) medicine is secured when conscious states are recognized in everyday medical science. Moreover, consciousness fully motivates traditional principles of clinical ethics if we understand respect for autonomy as respect for the dominion of an experiencer in the private, inescapable realm of bodily experience. When medicine’s foundations are grounded in recognition of consciousness, we understand how patients fully command respect even when they lack capacity to exercise their bodily dominion through decision-making. (shrink)

Postulating the subcortical organization of human consciousness provides a critical link for the construal of pain in patients with impaired cortical function or cortical immaturity during early development. Practical implications of the centrencephalic proposal include the redefinition of pain, improved pain assessment in nonverbal humans, and benefits of adequate analgesia/anesthesia for these patients, which certainly justify the rigorous scientific efforts required. (Published Online May 1 2007).

The paper discusses some recent suggestions offered by the so-called sensorimotor (or enactivist) theorists as to the problem of the explanatory gap, that is, the alleged impossibility of accounting for phenomenal consciousness in any scientific theory. We argue in the paper that, although some enactivist theorists’ suggestions appear fresh and eye-opening, the claim that the explanatory gap is (dis)solved is much overstated.

In this paper, I examine some important features of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s theories of consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, I discuss the distinction between mental states and conscious states, and the related question of determining whether all mental states can become conscious states. I interpret Brentano’s theory as a one-level theory of mind which is in keeping with the Cartesian conflation between mental states and consciousness. I argue that the problems arising from Brentano’s position are to a (...) certain extent surpassed by a higher-order theory, so that Rosenthal’s position is more accurate. Nevertheless, I disagree with both in the construal of the consciousness of a mental state as self-consciousness. I develop then the fundamentals for a theory based on the primacy of the organism and its vital world, and of conscious experience as the higher form of mental life, which has, however, its roots in the complex net of mental states which are not conscious states. (shrink)

En soulignant la position ressemblante du Dieu dans le système de Descartes et de Berkeley comme sujet de connaissance optimale, c'est à dire ' certain', et le rôle de la notion cartésienne de ‛certitude’ en définissant la nature de la vérité scientifique, on peut nettement transformer la théorie réalistique cartésienne en théorie idéalistique berkelienne. L'élimination une équivoque dans la conception de certitude de Descartes est crucial à cette transformation. Sans cette équivoque, la distinction cartésienne non-berkelienne entre la sensation et la (...) perception ne peut être défendu. Cette interprétation est évidemment en conflict avec le point de vue standard sur l'attitude de Descartes, comme rationaliste, concernant les sens, mais malgré cela, le texte y apportent un sérieux soutien. (shrink)

John Searle offers what he thinks to be a reasonable scientific approach to the understanding of consciousness. I argue that Searle is demanding nothing less than a Kuhnian-type revolution with respect to how scientists should study consciousness given his rejection of the subject-object distinction and affirmation of mental causation. As part of my analysis, I reveal that Searle embraces a version of emergentism that is in tension, not only with his own account, but also with some of the (...) theoretical tenets of science. I conclude that Searle has offered little to motivate scientists to adopt his proposal. (shrink)

Wilber's groundbreaking synthesis of religion, philosophy, physics, and psychology started a revolution in transpersonal psychology. He was the first to suggest in a systematic way that the great psychological systems of the West could be integrated with the noble contemplative traditions of the East. Spectrum of Consciousness, first released by Quest in 1977, has been the prominent reference point for all subsequent attempts at integrating psychology and spirituality.

(No abstract is available for this citation).

When you are in a joyful mood, how do you know that it is so? On a Cartesian picture, the answer is that you’ve got some immediate, noninferential apprehension of your being joyful, such as this noninferential apprehension is analogous to sense perception, and unlike sense perception, it makes it unquestionable or evident to you that you presently are in a joyful mood. In this paper, I defend this view against some classical objections, arguing that pre-reflective self-consciousness actually is (...) analogous to sense perception. (shrink)

This article analyses the forms of human thinking which fundamentally influence political life. The author distinguishes two of these forms – a monologic and a dialogic consciousness – and reveals philosophical pre-conditions for their formation in modern and postmodern times. The collision of these different forms of thinking is particularly relevant both for the countries of post-communist space and the old democratic traditions fostering Europe. The monologic consciousness is a closed thinking scheme rejecting the possibility of engaging in (...) a dialogic relationship with a person holding a different viewpoint and with the reality itself. In modern-time politics, it emerged through the creation of ideologies. Surprisingly, the contemporary postmodern society also creates pre-conditions for the formation of the monologic consciousness. It is determined by the mechanisms of manipulation of thinking, the consequence of democracy turning into demagogy. However, complex postmodern thinking is also disposed towards formation of the dialogic consciousness. The author demonstrates this process by the analysis of texts of postmodern authors, J. Derrida in particular. (shrink)

Alzheimer’s disease is an insidious onset neurodegenerative syndrome without effective treatment or cure. It is rapidly becoming a global health crisis that is overwhelming healthcare, society, and individuals. The clinical nature of neurocognitive decline creates significant challenges in bidirectional communication between caregivers and persons with Alzheimer’s disease that can negatively impact quality-of-life. This paper sought to understand how and to what extent would awareness training about the levels of consciousness in AD influence the quality-of-life interactions in the caregiver-patient dyad. (...) A literature review of multiple databases was conducted utilizing a transdisciplinary approach. The sum of findings indicates a positive relationship between enhanced caregiver awareness and training, positive interactions, and improved QOL measures among patients and caregivers. A multidirectional relationship was found among healthcare policies, training and education resources, caregivers, and persons with AD. Specifically, the current lack of policy and inadequate training and educational resources has various detrimental effects on patients and caregivers, while improvements in training and education of caregivers yields positive outcomes in communication and QOL. Furthermore, evidence of preserved consciousness in persons with AD was demonstrated from multiple disciplines, including neurobiological, psychological, and biopsychosocial models. The literature further revealed several methods to access the preserved consciousness in persons with AD and related dementias, including sensory, emotional, and cognitive stimulations. The evidence from the literature suggests a reframed approach to our understanding and treatment of persons with AD is not only warranted, but crucial to address the needs of those affected by AD. (shrink)