Affective Neuroscience and Addiction

American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):20-21 (2007)
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Abstract

Hyman (2007) should be commended for bringing up the vexing question of how “loss of control” in addiction relates to issues of moral responsibility. However, his account suffers from a cognitive bias that overlooks the affective and emotional dimensions of addiction. To fully understand these issues, we need to look beyond the confines of cognition and cognitive neuroscience. It is not the case that addiction must be either a brain disease or a moral condition, which is Hyman’s starting point (2007, 8). This dilemma is false. Addiction is both a brain disease and a moral condition and only by admitting the perspective of affective neuroscience can we explain why...

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Louis C. Charland
PhD: University of Western Ontario

Citations of this work

Addiction as an amoral condition? The case remains unproven.Hans Madueme - 2007 - American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):25 – 27.
Normative judgments, responsibility and executive function.Gregory Loeben & James D. Stoehr - 2007 - American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):27 – 29.

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