Aggregative Consequentialism

Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (2):125-136 (2015)
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Abstract

One of the major arguments against Act consequentialism is that it has counterintuitive implications in many kinds of cases. One of the methods of avoiding these counterintuitive verdicts is through the use of a “Generalization Argument” such as that proposed by Marcus Singer in his (1961) book Generalization in Ethics, which is intended to be an improved version of the traditional “What if everyone did that?” approach to moral theory. This Generalization Argument, however, also has counterintuitive implications due to over-generalizing. In the spirit of his nomenclature, I thus propose that a form of consequentialism that partially generalizes, in a sense explained below, can avoid some of these counterintuitive results. The purpose of my proposing this new theory is to explore the idea of using some filter to sort actions into the categories of permissible vs. impermissible, and then use a consequentialist maximizing framework to choose between only the permissible options.

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Roger Chao
La Trobe University

Citations of this work

Rule-Consequentialism's Assumptions.Kevin P. Tobia - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (4):458-471.

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