Can consequentialism cover everything?

Utilitas 15 (2):237-47 (2003)
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Abstract

Derek Parfit, Philip Pettit and Michael Smith defend a version of consequentialism that covers everything. I argue that this version of consequentialism is false. Consequentialism, I argue, can only cover things that belong to a combination of things that agents can bring about.

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Bart Streumer
University of Groningen

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality.Peter Railton - 1984 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (2):134-171.
Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Philosophy 69 (267):114-116.
An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics.John Jamieson Carswell Smart - 1961 - [Carlton]: Melbourne University Press on behalf of the University of Adelaide.
A Theory of the Good and the Right.Richard B. Brandt - 1979 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 35 (2):307-310.

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