Structural Distinctions: Entities, Structures, and Changes in Science

Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1385-1396 (2005)
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Abstract

Abstract. I argue that pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) seems to point an ontological priority of the relations over the objects of the scientific theories of the kind suggested by French and Ladyman (French and Ladyman 2003). My strategy will involve a critical examination of epistemic structural realism (ESR) and historical case-study: the prediction of Zeeman’s effect in Lorentz’s theory of electron.

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Angelo Cei
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Retaining Structure: A Relativistic Perspective.Jean-Michel Delhôtel - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (2):239-256.

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References found in this work

A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.
Defining 'intrinsic'.Rae Langton & David Lewis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.

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