Against widescopism

Philosophical Studies 125 (2):167-190 (2005)
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Abstract

Descriptivists say that every name is synonymous with some definite description, and Descriptivists who are Widescopers say that the definite description that a name is synonymous with must take wide scope with respect to modal adverbs such as “necessarily”. In this paper, I argue against Widescopism. Widescopers should be Super Widescopers: that is, they should say that the definite description that a name is synonymous with must take wide scope with respect to complementizers such as “that”. Super Widescopers should be Super Duper Widescopers: that is, they should say that the definite description that a name is synonymous with must take wide scope with respect to quotation marks. And Super Duper Widescopers should be Ultra Super Duper Widescopers: that is, they should say that, when the definite description that a name is synonymous with itself contains a name, the definite description that that name is synonymous with must take wide scope with respect to modal adverbs, complementizers, and quotation marks. But Descriptivists should not be Ultra Super Duper Widescopers. So Descriptivists should not be Widescopers either.

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Citations of this work

Theories of meaning (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions.Jeff Speaks - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):528-562.
Rigid designators.Joseph LaPorte - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic two-dimensionalism and the epistemic argument.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):59 – 78.
Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and the Epistemic Argument.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):59-78.

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References found in this work

The Interpretation of Fregeʼs Philosophy.Michael Dummett - 1980 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Reference and Description: The Case Against Two-Dimensionalism.Scott Soames - 2005 - Princeton: Princeton University Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.

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