On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):528-562 (2012)
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Abstract

Alvin Plantinga gave a reductio of the conjunction of the following three theses: Existentialism (the view that, e.g., the proposition that Socrates exists can't exist unless Socrates does), Serious Actualism (the view that nothing can have a property at a world without existing at that world) and Contingency (the view that some objects, like Socrates, exist only contingently). I sketch a view of truth at a world which enables the Existentialist to resist Plantinga's argument without giving up either Serious Actualism or Contingency

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Jeff Speaks
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Platonic Realism.Chad Carmichael - forthcoming - In Anna-Sofia Maurin & Anthony Fisher (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Properties.
The Virtues of Thisness Presentism.David Ingram - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2867-2888.
Propositional Contingentism.Peter Fritz - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (1):123-142.
Singular propositions.Greg Fitch - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
The nature and structure of content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.

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