Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):207-225 (2000)
AbstractIt is thought by some philosophers that certain arguments developed by Peter Strawson in Individuals show that Derek Parfit's claim in Reasons and Persons that experiences can be referred to without referring to persons is incoherent. In this paper I argue that Parfit's claim is not threatened by these arguments.
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References found in this work
Survival and Identity.David K. Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
Personal Identity.Sydney Shoemaker & Richard Swinburne - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (3):184-185.
Constitution Is Not Identity.Mark Johnston - 1992 - In Michael C. Rea (ed.), Material Constitution. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 44-62.
Citations of this work
Cerebros y experiencias. Una defensa del modelo no posesivo del yo.Ángelo Briones - 2021 - Ideas Y Valores 70 (175):73-93.
A Critical Review on the Thesis of the Depe ndence of the Experiences of Derek Parfit.Angelo Antonio Briones Belmar - 2019 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 30:238-267.
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