Abstract
Much of Jorge Gracia’s book is devoted to the definition of metaphysics. But he follows the traditional, though today ignored, distinction between nominal and real definitions. If we think of a definition of x as an answer to the question “What is x?”, an example of the former would be the entry under “bachelor” in a dictionary. An example of the latter would be the account in a chemistry textbook of the chemical structure of water. It is seldom clear that either sort of definition falls within the competence of philosophers, unless they happen to be also lexicographers or scientists. But on the nature of metaphysics, Gracia’s topic, of course philosophers alone are likely to be competent. Why? They alone are likely to know and to have reflected on what metaphysicians have done, i.e., to know the history of metaphysics. For such knowledge, we cannot do better than to go to someone like Professor Gracia.