Abstract

This work is concerned with the question of whether animals can have legal rights. Legal rights are often said to rest upon moral rights. This assumes that there is some connection between morality and law. I examine whether there is, or ought to be, such a connection. My first conclusion is that law ought to rest upon morality, and that laws are subject to criticism if they violate moral principles. Next, I examine the moral principle underlying the legal rights of mentally handicapped humans. Many individuals in this group lack one of the features put forward by philosophers as the basis for moral rights, namely, rationality defined in the Kantian sense. If mentally handicapped humans lack moral rights for this reason, their legal rights must be based on something else. My second conclusion is that the legal rights of the mentally handicapped are based on interests; we believe that interests are worthy of moral consideration and can be protected against violation with legal rights. Next, I examine whether it is theoretically sound to base rights upon interests. I examine challenges to this claim from Frey and others. My third conclusion is that the challenges do not succeed, and that it is theoretically sound to base rights upon interests. Next, I examine the question of whether animals, too, have interests, by refuting skeptical challenges to this claim from Frey, Davidson and Carruthers. My fourth conclusion is that animals do have interests. Moreover the interests of animals are routinely violated by humans. My final conclusion is that moral consistency demands that we protect the interests of animals with legal rights