Ethics and Behavior 7 (2):113 – 121 (1997)
AbstractAnimals have moral standing; that is, they have properties (including the ability to feel pain) that qualify them for the protections of morality. It follows from this that humans have moral obligations toward animals, and because rights are logically correlative to obligations, animals have rights.
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References found in this work
The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience.Donald Redfield Griffin - 1976 - William Kaufmann.
The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science.Bernard Rollin - 1989 - Oxford University Press.