Kant's philosophies of judgement

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (2004)
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Abstract

An extended philosophical analysis of the concept of judgement, important in many areas of contemporary philosophy, including epistemology, the philosophy of value and aesthetics.Kant's philosophy understands judgement in different ways in the cognition of nature, the appreciation of natural beauty, and in the determination of moral action. This book aims to explore these three 'philosophies' of judgement, producing in the process a new and creative reading of Kant's work. The result is a unique book-length study of judgement in general. At the core of this reading is an interpretation of how Kant understands reflection, presentation and activity. Novel aspects include accounts of the transcendental object, the implications of considering cognition as an activity, the structure of sensible givenness, Kant on the sublime, and the moral argument.The book draws upon ideas from within the Continental philosophy tradition, particularly from Nietzsche, Heidegger and Deleuze. To Nietzsche there is devoted a whole chapter on the subject of sensation and physics, which aims to expand upon and illuminate parallel discussions in the reading of Kant. Readers will find much of interest in this wide-ranging text, including treatments of key features in Kant's epistemology, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, philosophy of religion as well as his practical philosophy.Features* The first book to consider Kant's account of judgement in general.* A unique interpretation of Kant, employing philosophers in the Continental tradition - e.g Nietzsche, Heidegger and Deleuze.* Contains a sustained study of Nietzsche on the subject of sensation and physics.

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