Abstract

Both Spinoza and Hegel tried to articulate theories of the individual, as a metaphysical and ethical entity, that would overcome deficiencies that each found in prevailing theories. Critics have frequently misunderstood these "improvements" and portrayed Spinozan and Hegelian philosophies as fundamentally inimical to individuality and ethical freedom. Even today, although many scholars have come to the defense of Spinoza and Hegel, these errant criticisms linger on. Many people only concede that even if Spinoza and Hegel do not neglect the individual and freedom altogether, they also do not contribute much of significance to current debates on these topics. ;This dissertation is intended to address these lingering concerns about not just Spinoza's and Hegel's positions, but the value of their insights for our understanding of individuality and freedom. The focus of most existing, scholarly defenses of their work is either the specific ideas of one thinker in isolation from the other or the comparative study of their ideas on substance, modes, negation, or another, essentially metaphysical topic. While these are obviously important areas for research, on the single topic where Spinoza and Hegel are, arguably, most frequently and vehemently attacked---namely, the alleged denial of individuality and freedom---there is very little comparative scholarship and certainly no full-length study. This dissertation is an attempt to fill that lacuna. ;There are two, overarching objectives that will guide our progress in the pages that follow. First, I shall argue that Spinoza and Hegel both develop philosophical systems in which the dignity of the individual and its ethical freedom are preserved and promoted. Second, I shall argue that their theories offer us important insights into the complexity of the human being and fullness of ethical experiences that are not available, or at least not explicit, in competing theories of the individual and freedom