Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk

Philosophy of Science 80 (5):829-839 (2013)
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Abstract

Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake and unnecessary for avoiding the wishful thinking. Values have a deeper role to play in science.

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Matthew J. Brown
Southern Illinois University - Carbondale

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
Science, truth, and democracy.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
Science in a democratic society.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books.

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