Realism and the Anthropocentrics

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:202-210 (1984)
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Abstract

This paper examines the anthropocentric views of William Newton-Smith, Hilary Putnam, and Bas van Fraassen. It is argued in each case that the anthropocentric views in question are untenable and that the realist alternative is to be preferred

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James Robert Brown
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

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