Indeterminate Betterness

In Weighing lives. New York: Oxford University Press (2004)
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Abstract

This chapter gives qualified support to a fourth approach to incorporating the neutrality intuition. It considers the possibility that the betterness relation is indeterminate, but in the end supports the related but different view that betterness is vague. It adopts the supervaluation account of vagueness, which opens the way to continuing the development of the theory of weighing lives.

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John Broome
University Of Oxford

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