Dissertation, Vanderbilt University (
2014)
Copy
BIBTEX
Abstract
Since its 1929 publication, philosophers have been more or less unsure what to make of Heidegger's Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Although it wielded more than its fair share of influence over the course of the twentieth century, its chief interpretive claims are mostly untenable today. Of course, it has always been recognized that the book was never intended as a straightforward piece of Kant interpretation. But neither does it appear to be a reliable presentation of Heidegger's own thought. The result has been that, for all its influence, Heidegger's book has fallen into a kind of academic limbo, a concern for neither scholars of Heidegger nor scholars of Kant. My goal is to help return to Heidegger's reading of Kant its provocative power. I do so by means of a conceptual genesis of Heidegger's reading of Kant that takes both thinkers, as far as possible, on their own terms, but includes an investigation into why Heidegger was so convinced--for a few decisive years, at least--that he had to be able to find in Kant a precedent for his own path of thinking.