Abstract

Do moral philosophers need an account of human nature on which to base their normative claims? If we conceive of selves in relational terms, what are the implications for egalitarian theories, for accounts of agency, and for our views about reproductive technology? Does virtue theory commit us to the claim that members of privileged groups are unable to lead good lives? Does objectification admit of degrees? Can social contract arguments tell us anything about what makes sexual exploitation wrong? Contributors to _Feminist Moral Philosophy_ bring feminist perspectives to bear on these and other questions in moral philosophy. The result is a collection of essays that makes a contribution to both feminist ethics and moral philosophy broadly understood. Some of the essays in this volume approach the issues by reworking traditional concepts of moral philosophy, such as virtue and responsibility, in light of feminist insights. Others put traditional moral theories, such as Kantian ethics and virtue theory, to work on moral problems identified by feminist theorists. Finally, some of the essays take on the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions of traditional moral theorizing and explore the implications of revising those assumptions