Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit

New York: Oxford University Press (2007)
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Abstract

Beyond program explanation -- Mental causation on the program model -- Can hunter-gatherers hear color? -- Structural irrationality -- Freedom, coercion, and discursive control -- Conversability and deliberation -- Petit's molecule -- Contestatory citizenship : deliberative denizenship -- Crime, responsibility, and institutional design -- Disenfranchised silence -- Joining the dots.

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Can Hunter-Gatherers Hear Colour.Susan Hurley & Alva Noe - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan (ed.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. New York: Oxford University Press.
Beyond Program Explanation. Cynthia & Graham Macdonald - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan (ed.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. New York: Oxford University Press.
Beyond program explanation.Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan (ed.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1--27.
Conversability and Deliberation.John Ferejohn - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan (ed.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mental Causation on the Program Model.Peter Menzies - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan (ed.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. New York: Oxford University Press.
Disenfranchised Silence.Rae Langton - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan (ed.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. New York: Oxford University Press.
Structural Irrationality.Thomas Scanlon - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan (ed.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. New York: Oxford University Press.

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