Abstract

The philosophy of Spinoza can hardly be said to have been in the fore-front of recent developments in the philosophy of mind. Notwithstanding, Stuart Hampshire has put himself on record as saying “that in the philosophy of mind he [Spinoza] is nearer to the truth at certain points than any other philosopher ever has been.” The purpose of this paper is to get even nearer the truth with Spinoza’s leading. The idea of the body is, however, a confused idea; so confused, in fact, that Spinoza was never able to form an adequate idea of the idea. I wish to argue that Spinoza has even worse reasons than Descartes for taking the idea of the body to be the idea of something that “actually exists.” Lacking any appeal to the divine veracity, Spinoza’s contention that the body does exist constitutes a standing petitio for the whole of the philosophy of mind.