Do We Need a Metaphysics for Perception? Some Enactive, Phenomenological Reservations

Constructivist Foundations 11 (1):159-161 (2015)
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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “Towards a PL-Metaphysics of Perception: In Search of the Metaphysical Roots of Constructivism” by Konrad Werner. Upshot: I disclaim the need for a metaphysics for perception, in the sense of a general metaphysics, and suggest that the motivations for embarking on that project can be satisfied in an interesting way without any general metaphysical stock-taking, by appeal to phenomenological and enactive accounts of perception

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Matt Bower
Texas State University

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